

# DNS amplification attacks

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
# DNS amplification attacksとは

- 送信元を偽装したdns queryによる攻撃
  - 帯域を埋める
  - ‘smurf attacks’に類似
- 攻撃要素は
  - IP spoofing
  - DNS amp

# IP spoofing + DNS amp


- IP spoofing
  - 送信元IPアドレスを偽装したdns query
  - 反射パケットを利用するため
- DNS amp
  - UDP (簡単に利用できる)
  - 大きな増幅率 = ~ 60
  - リゾルバ (dns cache)による分散

# 反射(reflection)




# 増幅(amplification)


## 1. multiple replies




## 2. bigger reply




# DNS amplification



# DNS amplification attack




# 攻撃の相関関係






# view of bot #1




# view of bot #2


- a bot behind NAT box




# view of stub-resolver




# view of full-resolver



# view of victim



# 対策は・・・



# Disable Open Recursive DNS

- ‘open relay’なリゾルバがいっぱい
  - ISPのDNSサーバ
  - 各組織のDNSサーバ
  - 幾つかの、ちょっと賢い機器

# Source Address Validation


- BCP38/RFC2827
  - All providers of Internet connectivity are urged to implement filtering described in this document to prohibit attackers from using forged source addresses...



# IIJ/AS2497の場合

- **IIJ、全接続サービスにおいて「Source Address Validation」を導入**
  - <http://www.iij.ad.jp/pressrelease/2006/0308.html>
- IIJではSource Address Validationの実装にuRPFとACLを利用しています。

# IIJの基本ポリシー



# CISCO uRPF configuration

## uRPF strict mode

```
interface GigabitEthernet0/0  
ip verify unicast source reachable-via rx
```

## uRPF loose mode

```
interface GigabitEthernet0/0  
ip verify unicast source reachable-via any
```

# Juniper uRPF configuration

## uRPF strict mode

```
interface { ge-0/0/0 { unit 0 { family inet {  
  rpf-check;  
}}}}}
```

## uRPF loose mode

```
interface { ge-0/0/0 { unit 0 { family inet {  
  rpf-check { mode loose; }  
}}}}}
```

# 世の中の動き

- RIPE – IP Anti-Spoofing Task Force
  - EU地域での状況調査
  - documentの作成、公開
  - RIRでanti-spoofing実装を推進する手法の模索

# 参照先

- AL-1999.004 – DoS attacks using the DNS
  - <http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=80>
- The Continuing DoS Threat Posed by DNS Recursion
  - [http://www.us-cert.gov/reading\\_room/DNS-recursion033006.pdf](http://www.us-cert.gov/reading_room/DNS-recursion033006.pdf)
- SAC008 – DNS Distributed DDoS Attacks
  - <http://www.icann.org/committees/security/dns-ddos-advisory-31mar06.pdf>

**END**

