



# What happened and What We did after the Earthquakes in Kumamoto

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JANOG38 LT@Okinawa

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# Self Introduction

- Name: 西田 圭(Kei Nishida)
  - Janog36,37 ORG staff
- Affiliation: Kyushu Telecommunication Network Co. (QTNet)
  - in 16th year
  - Network design of IP services, maintenance of routers and servers
  - Operation and management of facilities like electric power supplies and air conditioners, and a relay network




# The First EQ (Foreshock?)

- April 14, 2016 (Thu) 9:26PM JST
  - Max Seismic Intensity 7 (Intensity 4 at Fukuoka)
  - Mobile phones of more than dozen team members received Emergency Earthquake Warning(EEW) at once
  - A big shake occurred in Fukuoka a few seconds later
  - There had been a series of aftershocks

# Traffic(Internet)


# Internet $\Rightarrow$ AS7679

(Apr. 14 0:00 - 23:59)




# Percentage of Increase and Decrease of Traffic / Area

(Comparing to 2 hours later from earthquake generation)



# Telephone

# Change in Volume of Calls






# The Next EQ(Main Shock?)

- April 16, 2016 (Sat) 1:25AM
  - Max Seismic Intensity 7 (Intensity 5 at Fukuoka)
  - EEW while sleeping after the response on the previous day!!
  - immediately went to the office
  - could not get a taxi... got in after an hour

# Traffic(Internet)


# Internet $\Rightarrow$ AS7679

(4/16 0:00~23:59)



# Percentage of Increase and Decrease of Traffic / Area



(Comparing to 2 hours later from earthquake generation)



# Telephone

# Change in Volume of Calls

EQ Generation 1:25



# Response to Blackout

- Blackout occurred at several centers in Kumamoto area
  - storage batteries temporarily supplied power source for a certain time, corresponding to the size of centers
  - power-supply cars deployed in each zone were dispatched to the spot
    - started power supply and continued it for about 4 days until recovery of the commercial power source by supplying fuel
    - no power outage at the centers



# Response to Blackout





# Response to Fiber Cut

- Optical fibers were cut by a landslide
  - Identified the spot and repaired by splicing in a patch
  - if not possible, laid new rerouted fibers

# Response to Fiber Cut



# Setting Up A Temporary Center

- For circuits which are not easy to recover, set a temporary center up.
  - negotiate a site for the building, build temporary Center, install power supplies
  - transport network devices in, install and test
  - recovered the circuit with in a few days!!



# Setting Temporary Center Up



# What I Felt

## 1. Co-operation between service providers

Electric power companies nationwide supported each other  
eg. dispatching about 80 power-supply cars

➡ISP, CATV and carriers based in local communities, and also nationwide datacenter providers, mobile providers and carriers; we are carrying information during natural disasters, so we can do something by cooperating with each other.

## 2. On recovering failures

➡ Communication lines carry information.

There are humans or devices needing the information at both end of the link  
We carry not just information, but also heart.

Fight! Kumamoto!!

Thank you!!